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Abstract
In this paper, I ask to what extent theory revision may be regarded as a branch of
cognitive economics. Theory dynamics has long been said to be driven primarily
by a concern for \informational economy". Asking about its descriptive as well as
its normative adequacy, we discuss and criticize the idea of informational economy
both with respect to theories and with respect to richer structures representing belief
states (identied with theory-revision guiding structures). This view is contrasted
with an alternative view of cognitve economics that takes theory change to be a
problem of rational choice based on complete and transitive preferences. Under
this interpretation, theory revision models are indeed amenable to an essentially
economic interpretation, but they inherit the criticism that has been levelled against
the classical theory of choice in wider contexts.
1 Introduction: What is economics?
Hausman (1998, Sections 1 and 2) gives the following summary of the domi-
nant school in the 20th century:
The main `orthodox', `neoclassical', or `neo-Walrasian' school models economic
outcomes as equilibria in which individuals have done as well for themselves as
they could given their preferences and the constraints on their choices. . . . Agents
are rational in the sense that their choices are determined by their preferences,
which are complete and transitive. . . . contemporary theoretical economics is
largely a theory of rational choice. This may seem surprising, since economics is
1
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supposed to be an explanatory and predictive science of the actual interactions
among people rather than a normative discipline studying how people ought
rationally to choose, but it is indeed a fact.
Rosenberg (1995) tells us about the \assumptions of the `economic man':
that all agents have complete and transitive cardinal or ordinal utility rankings
or preference orders and that they always choose that available option which
maximises their utility or preferences". Economic agents are viewed as having
denite preferences, and that when choosing actions or commodities, they
aim at satisfying their preferences as well as the circumstances allow. Not
just any kind of preference is considered to be appropriate. Preferences have
to be transitive and complete (technically speaking, they must be pre-ordering
or weak orderings), in order to be representable by a suitably chosen utility
function. Ties in preferences are permitted, of course, but incomparabilities
are ruled out. Economics is based on (or even: is an elaboration of) the theory
of rational choice. Here, choice is called rational or coherent if and only if it
is representable by a preference relation, and a preference relation in turn is
considered to be rational if and only if it is representable by a utility function.
Economics, then, is about rational rather than the actual behaviour of
individuals. The laws of economics should not be expected to be empirically
adequate, they are valid only as idealisations, or as norms.
2 Acting economically, a second view: \Informational
economy"
In the English language, there is a division of labour between the adjectives
\economic" and \economical". The former is closely tied to the noun \eco-
nomics" and means either \of or referring to economics", and has \protable",
\remunerative" and \gainful" as potential synonyms. The adjective \econom-
ical", on the other hand, is closely tied to the noun \economy" and means
essentially the same as \thrifty", \frugal" or \not wasteful". This particular
dierence of meanings turns out to be useful for our discussion.
Belief revision theory, also known as the theory of theory change,is of-
ten thought to be economical behaviour rather than economic behaviour.
The perspective of economy (rather than economics) was forcefully taken in
Gardenfors's inuential book Knowledge in Flux (1988). A glance at the in-
dex of the book makes it immediately clear that the criterion of informational
economy is employed to motivate the essential parts of the formal modellings
of Gardenfors and his collaborators Alchourron and Makinson.
3
Gardenfors
refers to this criterion for the motivation of belief expansions (1988, p. 49),
3
The landmark paper of belief-revision theory is Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson
(1985), for book-length treatments see Gardenfors (1988), Hansson (1999) and Rott (2001).
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belief revisions (pp. 53, 58) and belief contractions (p. 61).
4
Basically, the
criterion is taken to be identical with the idea of minimal change (p. 53) and
the conservativity principle (p. 67). According to Gardenfors,
The key idea is that, when we change our beliefs, we want to retain as much
as possible of our old beliefs { information is in general not gratuitous, and
unnecessary losses of information are therefore to be avoided. (Gardenfors 1988,
p. 49, similarly on pp. 16, 157)
Ever since the appearance of Gardenfors's book, the criterion of informa-
tional economy has been taken to be a \hallmark" of the research paradigm
created by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (henceforth, AGM).
5
3 Economic and economical considerations in belief re-
vision theory
In asking what is economic about belief change, we thus have to keep in mind
two dierent aspects. Besides the choice-preference-utility line of thinking
that we sketched in Section 1, we have found a second type of idea in the
thrifty clinging to the sentences one has accepted.
In AGM, it is easy to recognise the criterion of informational economy at
work in expansions of belief sets by sentences that do not contradict the prior
belief set. In such cases, AGM recommend simply to add the new sentence to
the prior beliefs and take the deductive closure of everything taken together.
6
However, as we shall see, there are no traces of this criterion for the belief-
contravening case which, after all, is the case for which logical models of belief
change have primarily been devised.
But Gardenfors's argument for conservatism can be generalised. It is one
of the most important philosophical insights of belief revision theory in the
1990s that belief states cannot be represented properly by belief sets only.
Something else has to be added, namely, some structure that encodes how the
agent is to revise his belief set in response to surprising information. Typically
there is a mechanism exploiting some sort of selection function or preference
relation. Let us call the structure exploited by the mechanism a belief-revision
guiding structure. If the new information is inconsistent with the presently
accepted belief set the pure idea of informational economy can be applied on
the level of revision-guiding structures. This at the same time denes a form
of conservatism that is usable for iterated belief change.
4
Throughout this paper, it is presupposed that revisions have to be successful in the sense
that they eÆciently incorporate the specied new piece of information into the current belief
set. Contractions are called successful if they eÆciently remove some specied sentence from
the belief set (unless that sentence happens to be a logical truth).
5
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Fig. 1 gives a representation of the various senses that \economic" and
\economical" can take in belief revision contexts. The branch at the left
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Fig. 1. Belief change performed economically
indicates the idea that economic agents may be conceived of as rational or
coherent choosers. On the right-hand branch, we represent the idea of infor-
mational economy. In the Sections 4{7, we trace a few important distinctions
within the principle of informational economy. As applied to sentences, it tells
us: \Don't give away your beliefs beyond necessity!" As applied to revision-
guiding structures, it tells us: \Don't change your doxastic preferences beyond
necessity!" These two maxims can further be distinguished as to whether they
concern the (interesting) belief-contravening case or only the (less interesting)
case where the new information is consistent with the agent's belief set.
Fig. 2 gives a dierent representation of the same situation in terms of
various dimensions of coherence. In the lower part there are six dots stand-
ing for options of belief base revision, where belief bases are sets of sentences
that need not obey the static coherence constraint of logical closure.
7
We will
focus on methods of changing belief sets that are presumed to be logically
closed { i.e., on the upper six dots. Basic changes represent options that
neither recognise economical constraints of minimal change nor economic con-
straints concerning the rationality of choices. Moving from left to right adds
economical constraints of minimal change, moving downwards adds economic
constraints on the rationality of choices. The label c-conservative denotes
7
For a thorough treatment of this topic, see Hansson (1999).
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Fig. 2. Three dimensions of coherence
conservativity restricted to the case where the input is consistent with the
current belief set
8
).
As the talk of \dimensions" meant to suggest, it is possible to add to the
basic form of belief revision elements of conservatism and elements of rational
choice independently from one another. In their seminal work of the 1980s,
AGM explored both pure conservatism with respect to sentences (so-called
maxichoice contraction and revision functions) and completely unconstrained
choices (the case where only AGM's six basic rationality postulates hold).
9
However, AGM rejected the idea of maxichoice functions as intuitively inade-
quate, and the main elegance and force of their theories derives precisely from
the supplementary postulates that go beyond the basic case. What makes the
work of AGM distinctive is a rather strong concept of rational choice gener-
ated by transitive and connected preferences, and a rather weak concept of
conservatism. They provided for conservatism with respect to beliefs in the
consistent case (where revision reduces to set-theoretic addition plus logical
closure), but they provided neither for conservatism in the belief-contravening
case nor for conservatism with respect to revision-guiding structures (they
provided no change mechanisms for revision-guiding structures at all). Con-
trary to wide-spread folklore, AGM paid a lot more respect to economics than
to the idea of informational economy.
8
In the common AGM numbering of axioms, these are the third and fourth postulates;
taken together they state that if : is not in B, then B   equals Cn (B [ fg).
9
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Systematic variations of the strength of the relevant ideas were investi-
gated only in the 1990s. On the one hand, weakenings of AGM's strong
presuppositions with respect to the rationalisability of choices are suggested
by Lindstrom (1991) and Rott (2001). On the other hand, strengthenings of
the very weak concept of conservatism in AGM are investigated by Boutilier
(1993, 1996) and Rott (2003a), oering models for economical belief change.
Interestingly, it has turned out that the most eÆcient way { and perhaps the
only way { of implementing conservatism with respect to beliefs in the belief-
contravening case is at the same time a form of conservatism with respect to
revision-guiding structures.
4 Informational economy with respect to beliefs: What
has been done?
We keep on stipulating that the set of sentences accepted by an agent be
logically consistent and closed. Moreover, we assume that when a belief set
is revised in response so some new piece of information, the revision process
successfully incorporates the new information, so that it is in fact an element
of the revised belief set. Let us call a consistent and logically closed belief set
that includes a new piece of information  a candidate revision of a belief set
B by . A (candidate) revision of B by  is called belief-contravening , if  is
inconsistent with B.
Consider two attempts at capturing the idea of informational economy on
the level of beliefs:
(1) When accepting a new piece of information, an agent should aim at a min-
imal change of his old belief set.
(2) If there are dierent ways of eecting the belief revision, the agent should
give up those sentences that are least entrenched.
These two maxims have frequently been appealed to as the principal mo-
tivation for logical models of belief change. However, in their most straight-
forward readings, they are a caricature of what has really been done in the
development of the standard models of belief revision. I have argued for this
at considerable length in Rott (2000).
5 Informational economy with respect to beliefs: What
should be done?
The demand for informational economy conicts with other desiderata. For
instance, it competes with the synchronic or static coherence constraints of
logical consistency and closure. If we nd ourselves caught in an inconsistency,
we should give up something , and we typically have to give up not only a
single culprit sentence, but also many sentences that are deductively related
with the latter. This is because we want to maintain the logical closure of our
35
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belief sets. But of course, a change that is minimal subject to the constraints
of consistency and closure will in general be a bigger change than one that is
minimal when no constraints are to be respected. Conservativity may itself be
viewed as a criterion of diachronic or dynamic coherence (Rott 1999). There
are more concepts of coherence that we will have reason to consider below,
viz., dispositional coherence and temporal coherence.
Secondly, it is instructive to contrast the ideas that are advocated in the
logical literature on belief revision with ideas recommended by philosophers
of science who usually think of belief change as arising in the (r)evolution of
scientic theories or research programmes. For the latter point of view, it may
suÆce here to rely on Quine and Ullian (1978). In Fig. 3, the `virtues' of hy-
potheses that these authors mention are contrasted with the criteria advocated
in the belief revision literature. We can immediately see that informational
Quine-Ullian
philosophy of science
{ Theory choice {
AGM-style
philosophical logic
{ Theory change {
empirical adequacy
(correspondence with reality,
truth)
success
simplicity
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and consistency
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@
@
 
 
 
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Fig. 3. Criteria for theory choice and theory change
economy is the only criterion that is endorsed both by Quine and Ullian and
the logical modellings of belief revision. A moment's thought makes it clear
that at least some of the virtues listed here compete with one another. There
is no obvious reason for according informational economy a privileged status
among the many contenders.
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6 Conservatism with respect to belief-revision guiding
structures: What has been done?
We now turn to a second implementation of the idea that agents should aim at
preserving what they have. The propositional content expressed by sentences
of the agent's language is not the only kind of information that may be deemed
valuable. One may also be interested in preserving the non-propositional in-
formation encoded in belief-revision guiding structures, i.e., in richer repre-
sentations of belief states. Two such representations that have gained some
currency in the literature are two kinds of doxastic preference relations.
First, consider plausibility orderings  of the set W of possible worlds,
with the understanding that u  v means that u is at least as plausible as
v in the belief state represented by . Given such an ordering , the core
set min

W = fu 2 W : there is no v 2 W such that v  ug of the -
minimal worlds contains exactly those worlds that are consistent with the
current belief set B, i.e., those that could be the real world given what the
agent believes. The ordering of the remaining worlds reects their relative
distance from this core set. Belief revision prompted by a new piece of in-
formation  then proceeds by manipulating the ordering of worlds in such a
way that all the minimal worlds in the revised ordering 


satisfy . This
is a mild constraint and leaves a lot of leeway for the exact specication of a
coherent revision mechanisms. The most conservative or economical way of
changing the plausibility ordering on W that respects the constraint was rst
dened and investigated by Boutilier (1993, 1996):
u 


v i

u 2 min

[] or
v =2 min

[] and u  v
Here [] denotes the set of all possible worlds satisfying . Given the basic
constraint that the set min



W of worlds dening the revised belief set B 
should be identical with the set min

[], the posterior ordering 


preserves
as much of the prior ordering  as possible.
10
Another way of richly representing belief states consists in entrenchment
orderings  of the set L of sentences (phrased in a given language), with the
understanding that    means that sentence  is at least as entrenched
as sentence  in the belief state represented by . Given an entrenchment
ordering , the set min

L = f 2 L : there is no  2 L such that  < g
of sentences that are minimally entrenched contain exactly the agent's non-
beliefs, i.e., the complement of his belief set B. The ordering of the sentences
within B reects how rmly they are endorsed by the agent, the relative
tenacity with which he is determined to cling to them. In this model, belief
revision prompted by a new piece of information  proceeds by manipulating
10
This claim is true if  is connected (i.e., \fully economical" in our sense) which is what
Boutilier presupposes. For unconnected preference relations the claim becomes problematic.
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the ordering of sentences in such a way that  is not minimally entrenched
under the revised ordering 


. A constraint that follows from basic AGM-
theory is that the revised belief set B   = L   min



L should be the set
f 2 L : : < ! g.
11
Again, this is a mild constraint and leaves a lot of
leeway for the exact specication of the appropriate revision mechanism. The
most conservative or economical way of changing the entrenchment ordering
that respects the constraint is investigated in Rott (2003a):
 


 i

 =2 B   or
 2 B   and   
i

!  : or
: < ! and   
Given the above-mentioned constraint, this ordering 


preserves as much
of the prior entrenchment ordering  as possible. As there is no unforced
deviation of


from, this recipe denes the most conservative or economical
way of changing an entrenchment ordering.
The account based on entrenchment orderings is essentially a generalisation
of the possible worlds account proposed by Boutilier. In the specic context
of the full comparability assumption made by Boutilier, however, the methods
are equivalent. They both satisfy an axiom for iterated belief revision which
is suÆcient to characterise conservative revisions of richer representations of
belief states. As shown by Boutilier (1993, 1996) and, in a more general set-
ting, by Rott (2003a), a repeated conservative change of B rst by a sentence
 and then by a second sentence  leads to the same result as a single revi-
sion of B by  , if  is inconsistent with the result of the revision of B by .
Taken together with basic AGM theory, this amounts to the following recipe
for iterated revision:
(B  )   =

(B  ) +  if : =2 B  
B   if : 2 B  
We call this recipe \conservative", because the upper line is just AGM's
c-conservativity generalised to the iterated case, and the lower line suggests
that if  cannot be accommodated consistently, the way of handling it in the
revised belief set B   is just the same as it was in the original belief set B.
Loosely speaking, the structure of the old belief set is stronger than the new
piece of evidence , making it seem as if the agent had never learnt about
.
12
11
See for instance Rott (2003b).
12
The appearance is deceptive, though, since in general (

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6=

 
and (


)

 
6=

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7 Conservatism with respect to belief-revision guiding
structures: What should be done?
Almost immediately after Boutilier had suggested conservative belief revision
as a natural extension of the AGM model, Darwiche and Pearl (1994, 1997)
provided an example (involving a red bird) that showed that the behaviour
dened by this model is queer. In more general terms, it can be demonstrated
that the model is temporally incoherent . The AGM-postulate of \success"
for revisions says that the most recent piece of information should always be
included in the revised belief set. Thus, at the moment of receipt a piece of
information is being treated as the most important one. But this privilege
is immediately lost when another, new piece of information comes in. To see
this, let ,  and  stand for sentences that are pairwise consistent, but jointly
inconsistent. Then iterated conservative change of the trivial belief set Cn ()
rst by , then by  and nally by  results in the belief set
Cn ()       = Cn (; )
The rst and the last piece of information are stronger than the one that comes
in between. Conservatism with respect to revision-guiding structures violates
the requirement that a good method of belief revision be temporally coherent ,
i.e., coherent in its attitude towards the value of the recency of information.
Rott (2003a) shows that the unwelcome eects of temporal incoherence remain
present in exactly the same way even if all of the dispositional requirements
of the AGM model complete pre-orderings of worlds or sentences are dropped.
As long as one decides invariably to accept new information (i.e., to regard
the last piece of information as the most important one), the only coherent
attitude towards the recency of information is to regard the second-last piece of
information as the second-most important one, and so on. Instead of Cn (; )
as above, the desired result would thus be
Cn ()       = Cn ( ; )
There is an alternative model of iterated belief revision that yields precisely
this result. This less conservative, more moderate model has been mentioned
and used quite a number of times in the literature, without there being a
canonical paper where the model was rst endorsed.
13
We now leave the eld of \economical reasoning" and turn to \economic
reasoning", i.e., to the left branch of Fig. 1 which refers us to the realm of
choices, preferences and utilities.
13
To my knowledge, the model was rst studied systematically by Abhaya Nayak (1994, also
see Nayak et al. 2003). I discuss the merits of this model and explain my label \moderate
belief revision" for it in Rott (2003a).
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8 Rational choices and logical properties: What has
been done?
In the classical AGM model of belief revision, the agent's dispositions to
change his belief set are reected by choice functions that can be rationalised
by a complete pre-ordering. All possible worlds are presumed to be com-
parable with each other in terms of plausibility (Alchourron, Gardenfors and
Makinson 1985, Grove 1988), and all sentences are presumed to be comparable
with each other in terms of entrenchment (Gardenfors and Makinson 1988).
These facts nd expression in the seventh and eighth postulates of AGM which
constrain the agent's disposition to change his belief set: (7) which is some-
times called Disjunction in the premises and (8) which is sometimes called
Rational monotonicity .
So far we have been discussing preference relations between worlds and
sentences. Rott (2001, Chapter 7) describes how one can use semantic choice
functions (for the selection of most plausible worlds) and syntactic choice
functions (for the selection of least entrenched sentences) in the construction
of belief revisions, and also how postulates for belief revision correspond to
rationality requirements for semantic and syntactic choice functions.
Postulates for belief revision correspond to requirements for the choice
functions that govern the selection of most plausible models or the selection
of least entrenched sentences. In Table 1,  refers to a choice functions which
selects for any menu S the (typically non-empty) choice set (S) of `best'
elements of S.
(7) and (8) turn out to correspond to conditions on semantic or syn-
tactic choice functions known as Sen's Properties  and 
+
, which in eect
require that the revision function be rationalizable by a complete and tran-
sitive preference relation. Many concrete systems of belief revision, however,
do not satisfy (7) and (8). It is reassuring to nd that one can draw on
the rich resources of the theory of rational choice in order to introduce ap-
propriate weakenings of AGM's belief revision postulates. Both Property 
and Property 
+
can be weakened in various interesting and reasonable ways.
Postulate (7c) is a weakening of (7) that corresponds to the condition Cut
in non-monotonic reasoning. The weakening (8c) of (8) corresponds to the
condition of cumulative monotonicity in non-monotonic reasoning; the paral-
lel weakening of Property 
+
is known as Aizerman's axiom in the theory of
rational choice (see Moulin 1985). Postulates (8d), (8wd) and (8vwd) are
known as variants of Disjunctive rationality . The latter two conditions have
a well-established counterpart in the theory of choice, viz., Sen's Property .
Postulate (8n) is known as negation rationality in non-monotonic reasoning.
The theory of rational choice is a powerful instrument suitable for con-
structing revision operations that are much more exible than the original
AGM ones. Belief revision theory can thus be interpreted as being based on
economical principles. We are now going, however, to cast a shadow over this
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POSTULATES FOR REVISIONS POSTULATES FOR CHOICES
(7c) If  2 B  , then
B  ( ^  )  B  
If S  S
0
and (S
0
)  S ,
then (S
0
)  (S)
(7)
(7
0
)
(B  ) \ (B   )  B  ( _  )
B  ( ^  )  (B  ) +  
() If S  S
0
,
then S \ (S
0
)  (S)
(8c) If  2 B   , then
B    B ( ^  )
(Aiz) If S  S
0
and (S
0
)  S ,
then (S)  (S
0
)
(8) If : =2 B   , then
(B  ) +   B  ( ^  )
(
+
) If S  S
0
and (S
0
) \ S 6=  ,
then (S)  (S
0
)
(8d) B  ( _  )  (B  ) [ (B   ) If x 2 (S) and y 2 (S
0
), then
x 2 (S [ S
0
) or y 2 (S [ S
0
)
(8wd) B  ( _  ) 
(B  ) +  [ (B   ) + 
() (S) \ (S
0
)  (S [ S
0
)
for syntactic choices
(8vwd) B  ( _  ) 
Cn ((B  ) [ (B   ))
() (S) \ (S
0
)  (S [ S
0
)
for semantic choices
(8n) B   
B  ( ^  ) [ B  ( ^ : )
If S \ S
0
= , then (S) 
(S [ S
0
) or (S
0
)  (S [ S
0
)
for semantic choices
If S \ S
0
 Cn (), then (S) 
(S [ S
0
) or (S
0
)  (S [ S
0
)
for syntactic choices
(8m) B    B  ( ^  ) If S  S
0
, then (S)  (S
0
)
Table 1
Correspondences between revisions and choices
neat picture.
9 Rational choices and logical properties: What should
be done?
Almost from its beginning the classical theory of rational choice has been
subjected to serious criticism. I now present an argument to the eect that
a fundamental problem for the theory of rational choice transfers directly to
belief revision theories.
Consider the following example. A well-known philosophy department has
announced a position in metaphysics. Among the applicants for the job there
is Amanda Anderson, a young but already distinguished, excellent metaphysi-
cian. Second, there is Bernice Becker, who is also denitely very good, though
not quite as accomplished, in metaphysics as Andrews. Becker has also done
some substantial research in logic. A third applicant is Carlos Cortez. He has
a comparatively slim record in metaphysics, but he is widely recognised as one
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of the most brilliant logicians of his generation. Suppose that our initial set
of beliefs and expectations about the case includes that neither Anderson nor
Becker nor Cortez will get the job, that there is only one job available.
Consider now three hypothetical scenarios, each of which describes a po-
tential development of the selection procedure (the scenarios do not describe
a sequence of stages of the procedure). Let the letters a, b and c stand for the
statements that Anderson, Becker and Cortez, respectively, will be oered the
position.
Scenario 1. The dean tells us in condence that it has been decided that
either Anderson or Becker will be appointed. This message comes down to
supplying us with the premise a _ b. Given this premise, we conclude that
Anderson, being the better metaphysician, will get the job, and that the other
candidates will return empty-handed.
Scenario 2. We are told by the dean that Cortez is actually the only serious
candidate left in the competition. This is very surprising, but there is no need
to invest a lot of thinking here. We accept c in this case.
Scenario 3. The dean tells us that it has been decided that either Anderson
or Becker or Cortez will get the job, thus supplying us with the premise a_b_c.
This piece of information triggers o a rather subtle line of reasoning. Knowing
that Cortez is a splendid logician, but that he can hardly be regarded as a
metaphysician, we realise that competence in logic is considered to be a non-
negligible asset by the selection committee. Still we keep on believing that
Cortez will not make it, because his credentials in metaphysics are just too
weak. Since, however, logic appears to contribute positively to a candidate's
prole, we conclude that Becker, and not Anderson, will get the job.
14
We can now show that this situation refutes some of the basic logical
principles of \economic" belief revision.
First, the example shows that Disjunction in the premises, (7), does not
hold. Take (7) and substitute a_ b for  and c for  . Then notice that :b is
believed if the input is a_ b, and also if the input is c. But :b is not believed
if the input is a _ b _ c. Thus the revised belief set B  (a _ b _ c) does not
include what is common to B  (a _ b) and B  c, and (7) is violated.
Secondly, we nd that the situation does not conform to the weakened
monotonicity postulate (8c). Take (8c) and substitute a _ b _ c for  and
a _ b for  . Even though we believe that a _ b is true if we are given the
14
This qualitative description should do for our purposes, but for readers who prefer more
precision, the following story may help. The selection committee has decided to assign
points to evaluate the candidates' work. Anderson scores 97 out of 100 in metaphysics, but
as she has done no logic whatsoever, she scores 0 here. Becker scores 92 in metaphysics and
a respectable 50 in logic. Cortez scores only 40 in metaphysics, but boasts of 99 in logic. In
scenario 1, we take it that metaphysics is the only desideratum, so clearly Anderson must
be the winner. Scenario 2 is trivial. In scenario 3, we gather that, rather unexpectedly,
logic matters. As can easily be veried, any weight we attach to logic between
1
=
10
and
1
=
2
(with metaphysics taking the rest) will see Becker end up in front of both Anderson
and Cortez.
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information a_ b_ c, it is not the case that everything believed on the basis of
the latter is also believed on the basis of (a_ b_ c)^ (a_ b) which is equivalent
with a_b. Sentences :a and b are counterexamples. Thus the revised belief set
B(a_b_c) is not a subset of the belief set B((a_b_c)^(a_b)) = B(a_b),
and (8c) is violated. A fortiori , (8) is violated as well.
10 Conclusion
We have reviewed work in the tradition of the AGM approach to belief revi-
sion, asking to what extent economic(al) principles have played a role in the
actual development of this paradigm, and to what extent such considerations
should have been followed. Our conclusions are mostly negative. Informa-
tional economy (conservatism) with respect to beliefs, although widely adver-
tised as the central motivation of belief revision models, turns out not to have
played anything like a dominant role in the development of such models, and
we have found no reason why it should. Conservatism with respect to revision-
guiding preferences has in fact been suggested as a strategy for iterated belief
revision, but it soon turned out to have unwelcome consequences. So belief
revision theory has as a matter of fact not focused on economy , and the idea of
economical belief revisions has very limited normative force, too. Regarding
economic belief revision, our ndings are more encouraging. It is possible to
reconstruct large portions of belief revision in terms of rational choice theory.
As a matter of fact, ideas coming from economics have prevailed in the AGM
paradigm and related approaches. However, at the end of the paper we have
found that a fundamental problem of general choice theory seriously infects
the specic application area of belief revision.
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